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An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising:  
Sponsored Search and Cross-Selling in Electronic Markets 
 
      Abstract 
The phenomenon of sponsored search advertising – where advertisers pay a fee to Internet search 
engines to be displayed alongside organic (non-sponsored) web search results – is gaining ground as 
the largest source of revenues for search engines. Using a unique panel dataset of several hundred 
keywords collected from a large nationwide retailer that advertises on Google, we empirically model 
the relationship between different metrics such as click-through rates, conversion rates, bid prices and 
keyword ranks. Our paper proposes a novel framework and data to better understand what drives 
these differences. We use a Hierarchical Bayesian modeling framework and estimate the model using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We empirically estimate the impact of keyword 
attributes on consumer search and purchase behavior as well as on firms’ decision-making behavior 
on bid prices and ranks. We find that the presence of retailer-specific information in the keyword 
increases click-through rates, and the presence of brand-specific information in the keyword increases 
conversion rates. Our analysis provides some evidence that advertisers are not bidding optimally with 
respect to maximizing the profits. We also demonstrate that as suggested by anecdotal evidence, 
search engines like Google factor in both the auction bid price as well as prior click-through rates 
before allotting a final rank to an advertisement. Finally, we conduct a detailed analysis with product 
level variables to explore the extent of cross-selling opportunities across different categories from a 
given keyword advertisement. We find that there exists significant potential for cross-selling through 
search keyword advertisements. Latency (the time it takes for consumer to place a purchase order 
after clicking on the advertisement) and the presence of a brand name in the keyword are associated 
with consumer spending on product categories that are different from the one they were originally 
searching for on the Internet. 
 
Keywords: Online advertising, Search engines, Hierarchical Bayesian modeling, Paid search, Click-
through rates, Conversion rates, Keyword ranking, Bid price, Electronic commerce, Cross-Selling, 
Internet economics. 
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1. Introduction  
The Internet has brought about a fundamental change in the way consumers obtain information, 
thereby facilitating a paradigm shift in consumer search and purchase patterns. In this regard, search 
engines are able to leverage the value as information location tools by selling advertising linked to 
search terms entered by online users and referring them to the advertisers. Indeed, the phenomenon 
of sponsored search advertising – where advertisers pay a fee to Internet search engines to be 
displayed alongside organic (non-sponsored) web search results – is gaining ground as the largest 
source of revenues for search engines. The global paid search advertising market is predicted to have a 
37 percent compound annual growth rate, to more than $33 billion in 2010 and has become a critical 
component of firm’s marketing campaigns. This is not surprising given that 94% of consumers use 
search engines to find information on the Web, and 81% who use search engines find the information 
they are looking for every time (Nielson-Net Ratings). 
 
Search engines like Google, Yahoo and MSN have discovered that as intermediaries between users 
and firms, they are in a unique position to try new forms of advertisements without annoying 
consumers. In this regard, sponsored search advertising has gradually evolved to satisfy consumers’ 
penchant for relevant search results and advertisers' desire for inviting high quality traffic to their 
websites. These keyword advertisements are based on customers’ own queries and are thus considered 
far less intrusive than online banner advertisements or pop-ups. In many ways, one could imagine that 
this enabled a shift in advertising from ‘mass’ advertising to more ‘targeted’ advertising.  How does 
this mechanism work? In sponsored search, firms who wish to advertise their products or services on 
the Internet submit their product information in the form of keyword listings to search engines. Bid 
values are assigned to each individual keyword to determine the placement of each listing among 
search results when a user performs a search. When a consumer searches for that term on a search 
engine, the advertisers’ web page appears as a sponsored link next to the organic search results that 
would otherwise be returned using the neutral criteria employed by the search engine. By allotting a 
specific value to each keyword, an advertiser only pays the assigned price for the people who click on 
their listing to visit its website. Because listings appear when a keyword is searched for, an advertiser 
can reach a more targeted audience on a much lower budget. 
 
Despite the growth of search advertising, we have little understanding of how consumers respond to 
contextual and sponsored search advertising on the Internet. In this paper, we focus on previously 
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unexplored issues: How does sponsored search advertising affect consumer search and purchasing 
behavior on the Internet? More specifically, what features of a sponsored keyword advertisement do 
consumers respond to most during web search in terms of click-through rates and conversions? How 
do keyword attributes influence the advertiser’s actual and optimal bidding decisions, and the search 
engine’s ad ranking decision? Is there any potential for cross-selling products using sponsored search 
advertising? While an emerging stream of theoretical literature in sponsored search has looked at 
issues such as mechanism design in auctions, no prior work has empirically analyzed these kinds of 
questions. Given the shift in advertising from traditional banner advertising to search engine 
advertising, an understanding of the determinants of conversion rates and click-through rates in 
search advertising is essential for both traditional and Internet retailers. 
 
Using a unique panel dataset of several hundred keywords collected from a large nationwide retailer 
that advertises on Google, we study the effect of sponsored search advertising on consumer search, 
click and purchase behavior in electronic markets. We propose a Hierarchical Bayesian modeling 
framework in which we model consumers’ behavior jointly with the advertiser’s and search engine’s 
decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study that models and 
documents the impact of search advertising on consumer’s click-through, conversion and purchase 
behavior in electronic markets. Our findings and contributions can be summarized as follows.  
 
First, we build a model to empirically estimate the impact of various attributes of sponsored search 
advertisements (such as the ranking, the presence of retailer information, brand information and the 
length of the ad in words) on consumer click-through rates, and purchase propensities. We find that 
the ranking is negatively associated with the click-through rates and conversion rates, the presence of 
retailer-specific information in the keyword increases click-through rates, the presence of brand-
specific information in the keyword increases conversion rates, while the length of the keyword is 
associated with a decrease in click-through rates. By quantifying the magnitude of these effects in the 
domain of online advertising, we extend the existing literature that had examined the impact of 
traditional media advertising on consumer behavior. Further, by examining the differential impact of 
‘retailer-specific’ advertising versus ‘brand-specific’ advertising on consumer and firm decision-making 
processes, our research contributes towards the extant literature in marketing that has examined the 
implications of retail store advertising vis-à-vis national brand advertising in a channel context. 
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Second, we analyze the impact of these covariates on the decisions of the firms involved in the 
sponsored advertising process-the bid price of the advertiser and the rank allotted by the search 
engine to the advertiser. We show that while the advertiser is exhibiting some learning behavior over 
time by deciding their bid prices in accordance with past performance, they are not bidding optimally. 
A vast majority (94%) of the bids involve bidding above the optimal value, with the average deviation 
being 23.3 cents. We conduct policy simulations to assess the relative profit impact from placing 
optimal bid prices, and find that it can make substantial improvements in its expected profits. Finally, 
we also demonstrate that as postulated by the popular press, search engines are indeed taking into 
account both the bid price of the advertiser as well as the quality metrics such as prior click-through 
rates before setting the final rank of an advertisement. Our findings thus contribute towards providing 
empirical evidence about the bidding behavior and auction mechanism in search engines. 
 
Third, we present analysis with product level variables to explore the extent of cross-selling 
opportunities across different categories from a given keyword advertisement. By examining purchase 
incidence across categories, we find that there exists significant potential for cross-selling through paid 
search advertisements. Moreover, latency (the time it takes for consumers to place a purchase order 
after clicking on the advertisement) and the presence of a brand name in the advertisement play an 
important role in influencing the extent to which consumers spend on different product categories. 
Our research extended the existing marketing literature by investigating consumers’ acquisition 
decisions for multiple products when exposed to online advertising. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study of this kind in an online context.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the different 
streams of literature from marketing and computer science related to our paper. Section 3 describes 
the data and gives a brief background into some different aspects of sponsored search advertising that 
could be useful before we proceed to the empirical models and analyses. In Section 4, we present a 
model to study the click-through rate, conversion rate and keyword ranking simultaneously, and 
discuss our empirical findings. In Section 5, we study the cross-selling potential of paid advertisements 
by modeling the impact of ranking and keyword characteristics on consumer spending in the searched 
product category as well as in the non-searched product categories. In Section 6, we discuss some 
implications of our findings and then conclude the paper.  
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2. Prior Literature  
Our paper is related to several streams of research. It contributes to recent research in online 
advertising by providing the first known empirical analysis of sponsored search keyword advertising. 
Much of the existing academic (e.g., Cho, Lee and Tharp 2001, Gallagher, Foster and Parsons 2001, 
Dreze and Hussherr 2003) on advertising in online world has focused on measuring changes in brand 
awareness, brand attitudes, and purchase intentions as a function of exposure. This is usually done via 
field surveys or laboratory experiments using individual (or cookie) level data. Sherman and Deighton 
(2001) and Ilfeld and Winer (2002), show using aggregate data that increased online advertising leads 
to more site visits. In contrast to other studies which measure (individual) exposure to advertising via 
aggregate advertising dollars (e.g., Mela, Gupta and Jedidi 1998, Ilfeld and Winer 2002), we use data 
on individual search keyword advertising exposure. Manchanda et al. (2006) look at online banner 
advertising. Because banner ads have been perceived by many consumers as being annoying, 
traditionally they have had a negative connotation associated with it. Moreover, it was argued that 
since there is considerably evidence that only a small proportion of visits translate into final purchase 
(Sherman and Deighton 2001, Moe and Fader 2003, Chatterjee, Hoffman and Novak 2003), click-
through rates may be too imprecise for measuring the effectiveness of banners served to the mass 
market. Interestingly however, Manchanda et al. (2006), found that banner advertising actually 
increases purchasing behavior, in contrast to conventional wisdom. These studies therefore highlight 
the importance of investigating the impact of other kinds of online advertising such as search keyword 
advertising on actual purchase behavior, since the success of keyword advertising is also based on 
consumer click-through rates.  
 
A large literature in economics sees advertising as necessary to signal some form of quality (for 
example, Grossman and Shapiro 1984). Chen and He (2006) build a model of a market where there is 
only paid search and no organic search. Their model looks at paid search as an information signaling 
tool. There is also an emerging theoretical stream of literature exemplified by Edelman, Ostrovsky and 
Schwartz (2007) that examines auction price and mechanism design in keyword auctions.  
 
Despite the emerging theory work, very little empirical work exists in online search advertising. This is 
primarily because of difficulty for researchers to obtain such advertiser-level data. Existing work has 
so far focused on search engine performance (Telang Boatwright, and Mukhopadhyay 2004, Bradlow 
and Schmittlein 2000). Moreover, the handful of studies that exist in search engine marketing have 
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typically analyzed publicly available data from search engines. Animesh, Ramachandran and 
Viswanathan (2006) look at the presence of quality uncertainty and adverse selection in paid search 
advertising on search engines. Goldfarb and Tucker (2007) examine the factors that drive variation in 
prices for advertising legal services on Google. In a paper related to our work, Rutz and Bucklin 
(2007) studied the conversion rates of hotel marketing keywords to analyze the profitability of 
different campaign management strategies.   
 
To summarize, our research is distinct from extant online advertising research as it has largely been 
limited to the influence of banner advertisements on attitudes and behavior. We extend the literature 
by empirically comparing the impact of different keyword characteristics on the performance of 
online search advertising in paid search towards understanding the larger question of analyzing how 
keyword characteristics drive consumers’ search and purchase behavior, as well as firms’ optimal bid 
prices and ranking decisions.  
 
Our paper is also related to the stream of work in cross-selling. Amongst the first papers that formally 
model sequential ordering and the cross-selling opportunities is Kamakura, Ramaswami and 
Srivastava (1991). Their research applies latent trait analysis to position financial services and investors 
along a common continuum. Knott, Hayes and Neslin (2002) present next product-to-purchase 
models that can be used to predict what is to be purchased next and when. Li, Sun and Wilcox (2005) 
model consumers’ sequential acquisition decisions for multiple products and services, a behavior that 
is common in service and consumer technology industries. We thus contribute to the literature by 
demonstrating the cross-selling potential of paid search advertising in an online context, thereby 
supplementing the existing stream of work on cross-selling. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Data Description 
We first describe the data generation process for paid search advertisement since it differs on many 
dimensions from traditional offline advertisement. Once the advertiser gets a rank allotted (based on 
the bid price) to display its textual ad, these sponsored ads show up on the top left, right and bottom 
of the computer screen in response to a query that a consumer types on the search engine. The textual 
ad typically consists of headline, a word or a limited number of words describing the product or 
service and a hyperlink that refers the consumer to the advertiser’s website after a click. The serving 
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of a text ad in response to a query for a certain keyword is denoted as an impression. If the consumer 
clicks on the ad, he is led to the landing page of the advertiser’s website. This is recorded as a click, 
and advertisers usually pay on a per click basis. In the event that the consumer ends up purchasing a 
product from the advertiser, this is recorded as a conversion. The time between a click and an actual 
purchase is known as latency. This is usually measured in days. In the majority of cases the value of 
this variable is 0, denoting that the consumer placed an order at the same time as when they landed on 
a firm’s website.  
 
Our data contains weekly information on paid search advertising from a large nationwide retail chain, 
which advertises on Google.3 The data span all keyword advertisements by the company during a period 
of three months in the first quarter of 2007, specifically for the 13 calendar weeks from January 1 to 
March 31. Unlike most datasets used to investigate on-line environments which usually comprise of 
browsing behavior only, our data are unique in that we have individual level stimulus (advertising) and 
response (purchase incidence).  
 
Each keyword in our data has a unique advertisement ID. The data consists of the number of 
impressions, number of clicks, the average cost per click (CPC) which represents the bid price, the 
rank of the keyword, the number of conversions, the total revenues from conversion and the average 
order value for a given keyword for a given week. While an impression often leads to a click, it may 
not lead to an actual purchase (defined as a conversion). The product of CPC and number of clicks 
gives the total costs to the firm for sponsoring a particular advertisement. Thus the difference in total 
revenues and total costs gives the total profits accruing to the retailer from advertising a given 
keyword in a given week. 
 
Our dataset includes 5147 observations from a total of 1799 unique keywords that had at least one 
positive impression.4 Note that our main interest in this empirical investigation is to examine various 
factors that drive differences in click-throughs, conversions and transaction value during a purchase 
after conversion. Towards this, we proceed with two studies. In the first study presented in Section 4, 
we analyze click-through, conversion, bid price, and ranks based on the whole sample by jointly 
modeling the consumers’ search and purchase behavior, the advertiser’s bid pricing behavior, and the 
                                                 
3 The firm is a large Fortune-500 retail store chain with several hundred retail stores in the US but due to the nature of the 
data sharing agreement between the firm and us, we are unable to reveal the name of the firm. 
4 Note that not all keyword advertisements had a positive impression across all weeks. 
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search engine’s keyword rank allocating behavior. In the second study presented in Section 5, we use a 
subset of this data to study the impact of ranking, latency and keyword characteristics on consumer 
spending in the searched as well as in the non-searched categories. 
 
Table 1a reports the summary statistics of our main dataset. As shown, the average weekly number of 
impressions is 383 for one keyword, among which around 33 lead to a click-through, and 0.48 lead to 
a purchase. Our data suggest the conversion rate conditional on a click-through (0.013) is almost twice 
as high as the click-through rate (0.008). Moreover, the average bid price is about 30 cents, and the 
average rank of these keywords is about 5.2. Finally, we have information on three important keyword 
characteristics, which we next briefly discuss with a focus on the rationale of analyzing them. 
 
3.2 Keyword Characteristics 
Prior work in computer science (Broder 2002, Jansen and Spink 2007) have analyzed the goals for 
users’ web searches and classified user queries in search engines into three classes: navigational (for 
example, searching for a specific firm or retailer), transactional (for example, searching for a specific 
product) or informational (for example, longer keywords). In recognition of these electronic 
marketplace realities, search engines not only sell non-branded generic keywords such as 
advertisements, but also well-known brand names that can be purchased by any third-party advertiser 
in order to attract consumers to its Web site.5 Hence, we focus on the three important keyword 
specific characteristics for a firm (the advertiser) when it advertises on a search engine. This includes 
whether the keyword has (i) retailer-specific information (for example, "Retailername", Retailer 
Name", RetailerName.com"), (ii) brand-specific information (for example, a product or manufacturer 
brand name), (iii) and the length (in words) of the keyword. As shown in Table 1a, about 5.7% of the 
keyword advertisements in our data include the retailer’s name, and approximately 40% include a 
brand name.  By focusing on retailer and brand information in the keywords, we gain insights into the 
implications of searches coming from consumers who are aware of the advertiser and are likely to buy 
from the specific firm (Retailer-specific keywords) relative to those consumers who are aware of a 
nationally known product or manufacturer brand (brand specific keywords) and are likely to be more 
vulnerable to competition from other retailers. We discuss further implications in Section 6. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, a consumer seeking to purchase a digital camera is as likely to search for a popular brand name such as 
NIKON, CANON or KODAK on a search engine as searching for the generic phrase “digital camera” on the same 
search engine. Similarly, the same consumer may search for a retailer such as “BEST BUY” or “CIRCUIT CITY” on the 
search engine. 
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The length of the keyword is also an important determinant of search and purchase behavior but 
anecdotal evidence on this varies across trade press reports. Some studies have shown that the 
percentage of searchers who use a combination of keywords is 1.6 times the percentage of those who 
use single-keyword queries (Kilpatrick 2003). In contrast, another study on data generated by ‘natural’ 
search listings found that single-keywords have on average the highest number of unique visitors 
(Oneupweb 2005). To investigate the impact of the length of a keyword, we constructed a variable 
that indicates the number of words in a keyword that a user queried for on the search engine (and in 
response to which the paid advertisement was displayed to the user). In our data, the average length 
of a keyword is about 2.6. 
 
We enhanced the dataset by introducing keyword-specific characteristics such as Brand, Retailer and 
Length. For each keyword, we constructed two dummy variables, based on whether they were (i) 
branded or unbranded keywords and (ii) retailer-specific or non-retailer specific advertisements. To be 
precise, for creating the variable in (i) we looked for the presence of a brand name (either a product-
specific or a company specific) in the keyword, and labeled the dummy as 1 or 0, with 1 indicating the 
presence of a brand name. For (ii), we looked for the presence of the advertising retailer’s name in the 
keyword, and then labeled the dummy as 1 or 0, with 1 indicating the presence of the retailer’s name.  
= = Insert Table 1a = = 
 
4. A Simultaneous Model of Click-through, Conversion, Bid Price and Keyword Rank 
We cast our model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework and estimate it using Markov chain Monte 
Carlo methods (see Rossi and Allenby 2003 for a detailed review of such models). We postulate that 
the decision of whether to click and purchase in a given week will be affected by the probability of 
advertising exposure (for example, through the rank of the keyword) and individual differences (both 
observed and unobserved). We simultaneously model consumers’ click-through and conversion 
behavior, the advertiser’s keyword pricing behavior, and the search engine’s keyword rank allocating 
behavior.    
 
Assume for search keyword i at week j, there are nij click-throughs among Nij impressions (the number 
of times an advertisement is displayed by the retailer), where nij ≤  Nij and Nij > 0. Suppose that among 
the nij click-throughs, there are mij click-throughs that lead to purchases, where mij ≤  nij. Let us further 
assume that the probability of having a click-through is pij and the probability of having a purchase 
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conditional on a click-through is qij. In our model, a consumer faces decisions at two levels – one, 
when she sees a keyword advertisement, she makes decision whether or not to click it; two, if she 
clicks on the advertisement, she can take any one of the following two actions – make a purchase or 
not make a purchase.  
 
Thus, there are three types of observations. First, a person clicked through and made a purchase. The 
probability of such an event is pijqij. Second, a person clicked through but did not make a purchase. 
The probability of such an event is pij(1- qij). Third, an impression did not lead to a click-through or 
purchase. The probability of such an event is 1- pij. Then, the probability of observing (nij, mij) is given 
by: 
ijijijijij nN
ij
mn
ijij
m
ijij
ijijijijij
ij
ijijijij pqpqpnNmnm
N
qpmnf −− −−−−= }1{)}1({}{)!()!(!
!
),,,(    (4.1) 
 
4.1 Modeling the Consumer’s Decision: Click-through 
The click-through probability is likely to be influenced by the position of the ad (Rank), how specific 
or broad the keyword is (Length), and whether is contains any retailer-specific (Retailer) or brand-
specific information (Brand). Hence, in equation (4.1), pij the click-through probability is modeled as: 
)(1
)(
32110
32110
ijiiiijii
ijiiiijii
ij LengthBrandtailerReRankexp
LengthBrandtailerReRankexp
p εαααββ
εαααββ
++++++
+++++=      (4.2) 
 
We capture the unobserved heterogeneity with a random coefficient on the intercept by allowing βi0 
to vary along its population mean 0β  as follows: 
βςββ 000 ii +=              (4.3) 
 
We also allow the rank coefficient of the ith keyword to vary along the population mean 1β  and the 
keywords’ characteristics as follows: 
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4.2 Modeling the Consumer’s Decision: Conversion 
The click-through probability is likely to be influenced by the position of the ad (Rank), how specific 
or broad the keyword is (Length), and whether it contains any retailer-specific (Retailer) or brand-
specific information (Brand). In addition, the click-through rate (CTR) will also have an impact on 
conversion rates. Hence, in equation (4.1), qij , the conversion probability is modeled as follows: 
)(1
)(
321210
321210
ijiiiijijii
ijiiiijijii
ij LengthBrandtailerReCTRRankexp
LengthBrandtailerReCTRRankexp
q ηδδδθθθ
ηδδδθθθ
+++++++
++++++=     (4.6) 
 
As before, we capture the unobserved heterogeneity with a random coefficient specified on both the 
intercept and the rank coefficient, as follows: 
θςθθ 000 ii +=              (4.7) 
θςκκκθθ 132111 iiiii LengthBrandtailerRe ++++=         (4.8) 
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Thus, equations (4.1) - (4.9) model the demand for a keyword, i.e. consumer’s decision.  
 
4.3 Modeling the Advertiser’s Decision – Bid Price 
Next, we model the advertiser’s (i.e., the firm’s) strategic behavior. The advertiser decides its bidding 
strategy in terms of how much to bid for each keyword at week j. Since the firm optimizes its 
advertising strategies based on learning from past performances, we take into account two types of 
learning. The first is the most naïve learning that involves bidding sufficiently high so as to secure a 
good rank. This kind of learning is based on the outcome from the keyword’s rank in the previous 
period. The second kind is the more sophisticated kind of learning that will be based on the keyword’s 
profit in the previous time period where profit is defined as revenues from sponsored search 
advertising minus the costs of placing that advertisement for the firm (the cost is equal to the total 
number of clicks times cost per click).6  
 
These learning mechanisms can be expressed as follows: 
ijiiijiijiiiij LengthBrandtailerReofitPrRankBidPriceln µλλλωωω ++++++= −− 3211,21,10)( (4.10) 
ωςωω 000 ii +=              (4.11) 
                                                 
6 To normalize the distribution of this variable, we took the log (Profit). Since the profit value can also be less than 0 in 
some cases, we took the absolute value of the profit, and then assigned the correct sign before the transformed value.  
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ωςρρρωω 113121111 iiiii LengthBrandtailerRe ++++=        (4.12) 
ωςρρρωω 223222122 iiiii LengthBrandtailerRe ++++=        (4.13) 
 
The error terms in equations (4.11) – (4.13) are distributed as follows: 
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4.4 Modeling the Search Engine’s Decision – Keyword Rank 
Next, we model the search engine’s strategic behavior. The search engine decides on the ranking of 
each search keyword base on the submitted bid price from the advertiser and its previous click-
through rate.   
ijiiijijiiiij LengthBrandtailerReCTRicePrBidankRln ντττφφφ ++++++= −− 3211,21,10)(    (4.15) 
φςφφ 000 ii +=              (4.16) 
πςπππφφ 132111 iiiii LengthBrandtailerRe ++++=         (4.17) 
 
The error terms in equations (4.16) and (4.17) are distributed as follows: 
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Finally, to model the unobserved co-variation among click-through, conversions, bid price and the 
keyword ranking, we let the four error terms to be correlated in the following manner: 
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A couple of clarifications are useful to note here. First, the three characteristics of a keyword (Retailer, 
Brand, Length) are all mean centered. This means that 1β  is the average effect of 1iβ  in equation (4.4). 
A similar interpretation applies to the parameters 1iθ , 1iω , 2iω  and 1iφ . Second, in equations (4.6) and 
(4.15), the coefficient of click-through rate (CTR) is modeled as a fixed effect rather as a random 
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coefficient in order to facilitate empirical identification. Due to the fact that we have a large number 
of observations with zero click-through rates, empirical identification is difficult if we were to model 
CTR with a random coefficient specification. 
 
To ensure that the model is fully identified even with sparse data (data in which a large proportion of 
observations are zero), we conduct the following simulation. We picked a set of parameter values, and 
generated the number of click-throughs, the number of purchases, bid price, and ranking for each 
keyword, which mimicked their actual observed values in the data according to the model and the 
actual independent variables observed in our data. We then estimated the proposed model with the 
simulated dataset and found that we were able to recover the true parameter values. This relieves a 
potential concern on empirical identification of the model due to the sparseness of the data.  
 
4.5 Results 
Next, we discuss our empirical findings. We first discuss the effects of various keyword characteristics 
and keyword ranking on click-through rates of the sponsored search advertisements. The coefficient 
of Retailer in Table 2a, α1, is positive and significant indicating that keyword advertisements that 
contain retailer-specific information lead to a significant increase in click-through rates. Specifically, 
this is correspondent to 26.16% increase in click-through rates with the presence of retailer 
information. This result is useful for managers because it confirms that keyword advertisements that 
explicitly contain information identifying the advertiser lead to higher click-through rates than other 
kinds of keywords which lack such information.  
= = Insert Tables 2a and 2b = = 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient of Length in Table 2a is negative suggesting that longer keywords 
typically tend to experience lower click-through rates.  Specifically, we find that all else equal an 
increase in the length of the keyword by one word decreases the click-through rates by 3.6%. 
Intuitively, this result has an interesting implication if one were to tie this result with those in the 
literature on consideration sets in marketing. A longer keyword typically tends to suggest a more 
‘directed’ or ‘specific’ search whereas a shorter keyword typically suggests a more generic search. That 
is, the shorter the keyword is, the less information it likely carries and the larger context should be 
supplied to focus the search (Finkelstein et al. 2001). This implies that the consideration set for the 
consumer is likely to shrink as the search term becomes ‘narrower’ in scope. Danaher and Mullarkey 
(2003) show that user involvement during search (goal-directed versus surf mode) plays a crucial role 
 15
in the effectiveness of online banner ads. Since the consumers in our data get to see the ads displayed 
by all the retailers who are bidding for that keyword at the time of the search, the probability of a 
goal-directed consumer clicking on the retailer’s advertisement decreases unless the retailer carries the 
specific product that the consumer is searching for. In contrast, a consumer who does not have a 
goal-directed search (has a wider consideration set) and is in the surfing mode, is likely to click on 
several advertising links before she finds a product that induces a purchase. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the presence of a brand name in the search keyword (either a 
product-specific brand or a manufacturer-specific brand) has no statistically significant effect on click-
through rates although it does affect the conversion rates (we discuss more on this later). 
 
Some additional substantive results are exactly as expected. Rank has an overall negative relationship 
with CTR in Table 2a. This implies that lower the rank of the advertisement (i.e., higher the location 
of the sponsored ad on the computer screen), higher is the click-through rate. The position of the 
advertisement link on the search engine page clearly plays an important role in influencing click-
through rates. This kind of primacy effect has also been seen in other empirical studies of the online 
world. Ansari and Mela (2003) suggested a positive relationship between the serial position of a link in 
an email and recipients' clicks on that link. Similarly, Drèze and Zufryden (2004) implied a positive 
relationship between a link's serial position and site visibility. Thus, ceteris paribus, website designers 
and online advertising managers would place their most desirable links toward the top of a web page 
or email and their least desirable links toward the bottom of the web page or email. Brooks (2004) 
showed that the higher the link’s placement in the results listing, the more likely a searcher is to select 
it. The study reports similar results with non-sponsored listings.  
 
When we consider the interaction effect of these variables on the impact that Rank has on click-
through rates, we find that keywords that contain retailer-specific or brand-specific information lead 
to an increase in the negative relationship between Rank and click-through rates. That is, for keywords 
that contain retailer-specific or brand-specific information, a lower rank (better placement) leads to 
even higher click-through rates. On the other hand, we find that the coefficient of Length is 
insignificant suggesting that longer keywords do not have any impact on the negative relationship 
between click-through rates and Rank.  
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As shown in Table 2b, the estimated unobserved heterogeneity covariance is significant including all 
of its elements. This suggests that the baseline click-through rates and the way that keyword ranking 
predicts the click-through rates are different across keywords, driven by unobserved factors beyond 
the three observed keyword characteristics.  
 
Next consider Tables 3a and 3b with findings on conversion rates. Our analysis reveals that the 
coefficient of Brand, δ2, is positive and significant indicating that keywords that contain information 
specific to a brand (either product-specific or manufacturer-specific) experience higher conversion 
rates on an average. Specifically, the presence of brand information in the keyword increases 
conversion rates by 23.76%.  This suggests that ‘branded’ keywords are indeed more valuable to an 
advertiser than ‘non-branded' ones.  
 
In contrast neither Length, nor Retailer is statistically significant in their overall effect on conversion 
rates. As expected, Rank has a negative relationship with conversion rates. Lower the Rank (i.e., higher 
the sponsored keyword on the screen), higher is the Conversion Rate.  Also as expected, CTR has a 
positive relationship with conversation rates. Higher the CTR, higher the conversion rate. To be precise, 
an increase in click-through rate from 0 (min) to 1 (max) increases conversion by as much as 126.1% 
while a decrease in the rank from the maximum possible position or worst case scenario (which is 64 
in our data) to the minimum position or best case scenario (which is 1 in our data) increases 
conversion by 99.8%. These analyses suggest that in terms of magnitude, the rank of a keyword on 
the search engine has a smaller impact on conversion rates than CTR. 
= = Insert Tables 3a and 3b = = 
 
When we consider the effect of these keyword characteristics on the impact of Rank on the 
conversion rate, we find that keywords that are specific to a brand do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the relationship between rank and conversion rates. However, keywords that 
have retailer information in them do moderate the relationship between Rank and conversion rate. 
The length of a keyword typically has no significant effect on the relationship between Conversion Rate 
and Rank. Recall that because we model the coefficient of CTR, 2θ , as a fixed effect for the empirical 
identification purpose, there are no coefficients for Retailer, Brand and Length in its case.  
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As shown in Table 3b, the estimated unobserved heterogeneity covariance is significant including all 
of its elements. This suggests that the baseline conversion rates and the way that keyword ranking 
predicts the click-through rates are different across keywords, driven by unobserved factors. 
 
Next, we turn to firms’ behavior. Interestingly, the analysis of bid prices reveals that there is a negative 
relationship between Bid Price and Retailer as well as between Bid Price and Brand, whereas there is a 
positive relationship between Bid Price and Length. This implies that the firm places lower bids for 
advertisements that contain retailer or brand information and higher bids for those advertisements 
that are narrow in scope. Further, there is a negative relationship between Bid Price and Lag Rank as 
well Lag Profit. These results are indicative of the fact that while there is some naïve learning behavior 
exhibited by the firm, it is certainly not bidding optimally. Towards investigating the extent to which 
the firm is deviating from optimal bid prices, we conduct some policy simulations. These details are 
presented in Section 4.6. 
 
Finally, on the analysis of Rank, we find that all three covariates-Retailer, Brand and Length have a 
statistically significant and negative relationship with Rank, suggesting that the search keywords that 
have retailer-specific information or brand-specific information or are more specific in their scope 
generally tend to have lower ranks (i.e., they are listed higher up on the screen).  
 
How do search engines decide on the final rank? Anecdotal evidence and public disclosures by 
Google suggest that it incorporates a performance criterion along with bid price when determining 
the ranking of the advertisers. The advertiser in the top position might pay more per click than the 
advertiser in the second position, but there is no guarantee that it will be displayed in the first slot. 
This is because past performance such as click-through rates are factored in by Google before the 
final ranks are published. Like Google, MSN and Yahoo also decide on the final ranks based on both 
max bid price and previous click-through rate. The coefficients of Bid Price and Lag CTR are negative 
and statistically significant in our data. Thus, our results from the estimation of the Rank equation 
confirms that the search engine is indeed incorporating both bid prices and previous click-through 
rates in determining the final rank of a keyword. Note from Table 5a that the coefficient of Bid Price is 
more than twice the coefficient of Lag CTR, suggesting that bid price has a much larger role to play in 
determining the final rank. 
= = Insert Tables 5a and 5b = = 
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Finally, it is worth noting in Table 6 that the unobserved covariance between (i) click-through 
propensity and bid price, (ii) between click-through propensity and keyword rank, and (iii) between 
conversion propensity and bid price all turn out to be statistically significant. This suggests that 
keyword ranking is endogenous and the firm’s bids are likely to be based on the same keyword’s past 
performance. Therefore, it is important to simultaneously model the consumer’s click-through and 
purchase behavior, and the advertiser’s and search engine’s decisions.  
= = Insert Table 6 = = 
4.6 Policy Simulations 
A primary goal of research in marketing is to evaluate and recommend optimal policies for marketing 
actions. Towards this, we estimate the optimal bid price for each keyword and assess how much the 
advertiser’s decision (actual bid price) deviates from the optimal bid price based on our model 
estimates. Using the parameter estimates from the click-through, conversion and rank models and 
data on CTR, conversion rates, revenues and actual bid price of each advertisement, we estimated the 
expected profit of the firm.  
 
We assume the advertiser determines the optimal bid price for each keyword to maximize the 
expected profit (Π ) from each consumer impression of the advertisement: 
)( ijijijijij icePrBidrqp −=Π            (4.20)  
In equation (4.20), pij  is the expected click through rate for keyword i at week j, qij is the expected 
conversion rate conditional on a click through, rij  is the expected revenue from a conversion that is 
observed from our data, and BidPriceij is the actual cost per click (bid price) paid by the advertiser to 
the search engine for each keyword. pij , qij and Rankij are predicted based on equations (4.2), (4.6) and 
(4.15) respectively, using the estimates obtained from the proposed model. Note that both the click-
through rate pij and the conversion rate qij are functions of Rankij which is a function of the BidPriceij. 
 
We conduct the optimization routine to maximize the expected profit from each consumer 
impression of the advertisement for each keyword at each week, using the grid search. Our simulation 
results highlight that there is a considerable amount of difference in the optimal bid prices and the 
actual bid prices, with the average deviation being 23.3 cents per bid. In terms of bid prices, we find 
that a vast majority of the bids actually highlight that the firm is overbidding. Specifically, 6% of the 
bids are below the optimal bid prices with the average difference being 67 cents, while the remaining 
94% of the bids are above the optimal bid price with the average difference being 28.7 cents. We also 
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examined the deviation from the optimal bid prices based on whether the advertisement had retailer 
or brand information. On an average, the firm was underbidding by 11.2 cents for each ad that had 
retailer information in it and was overbidding by 16.4 cents for each ad that had brand information in 
it. For those keywords that did not have retailer or brand information in them the firm was generally 
overbidding with the range going from 25.4 cents to 27.7 cents. These results are very intuitive: the 
lack of competition for retailer-specific keywords is likely to be driving the underbidding behavior 
while the presence of intense competition in branded or generic keywords would be driving the 
overbidding behavior. 
 
Consequently, there is significant amount of divergence between optimal expected profits and actual 
profits accruing to the firm from their current bid prices, with the average difference being 1.14 times 
the expected profits with actual bid prices. Next we examined the sample based on overbidding or 
underbidding behavior. We found that the average difference in profits is 1.15 times the expected 
profits with actual bid prices when the firm is overbidding. When the firm is underbidding, the ratio is 
1.05.  Figure 1a and 1b highlight the differences from the use of optimal and actual bid prices.  
= = Insert Figures 1a and 1b = = 
 
In order to investigate how the three keyword level covariates are associated with optimal bid prices, 
we ran some OLS regressions with keyword level random effects. The dependent variable was the 
optimal bid price. Our analysis reveals that the presence of retailer-specific information (Retailer) or 
brand-specific (Brand) information leads to an increase in the optimal bid price, while longer keywords 
(Length) is associated with a lower optimal bid price. Specifically, the presence of retailer and brand 
information should lead to an increase in the optimal bid prices by 21.5% and 3.9%, respectively while 
an increase in the length of the keyword by one word should lead to a decrease in the bid price by 
2.3%. Note that this is in contrast to the results from equation (4.10) wherein using actual bid prices 
we found that the firm is actually decreasing bid prices when it has either retailer or brand information 
in the keywords, and increasing bid prices for longer keywords.  
 
To summarize, while the firm is exhibiting some learning behavior over time in terms of deciding on 
bid prices based on its rank and profit in the previous period, our simulations suggest that it can 
improve its profits dramatically by bidding optimally. Further, it would be better off by placing higher 
bids on keyword advertisement that either have retailer or brand information in them, and lower bids 
as keywords become longer. Moreover, we also find that expected profits from retailer-specific 
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keywords are likely to be much higher than those from brand-specific keywords. We discuss the 
implications of these findings in Section 6. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis: Impact of Sponsored Search Advertisement on Cross-Selling  
In this section, we investigate the impact of sponsored search advertising in a given category on 
consumer’s propensity to buy products across other categories. Our dataset has detailed information 
on the various categories of products that were eventually purchased by consumers after they had 
clicked on any given paid advertisement. There are six product categories in our data: bath, bedding, 
electrical appliances, home décor, kitchen and dining. Due to the confidentiality agreement with the 
firm that gave us the data, we are not able to reveal any more details about the individual products 
within these categories. Since, our analysis is about the cross-selling potential of a given product-based 
advertisement, we exclude advertisements that only have the retailer information in them but no 
product information. Hence, we focus on the 801 observations from 166 keywords that have some 
product or product category information imbedded in them. Table 1b reports the summary statistics 
of the data. As shown, the average spending is 79 dollars on the searched product category, and 21.8 
dollars on the non-searched product category. The average latency is about a day. These statistics 
provide some evidence suggesting that keyword advertising can lead to purchases on a non-searched 
product category, and consumers may wait for a while after starting the search to complete an order. 
= = Insert Table 1b = = 
 
Each order can lead to a purchase from the searched product category and/or from any of the other 
five non-searched product categories. We model the consumer purchase behavior as a two-stage 
decision process. In the first stage, the consumer decides on how much to spend on the searched 
product category. We adopt the Tobit model specification to account for a large number of zeros in 
consumer spending on either the searched product category or non-searched product categories. Let’s 
denote ownijy  as the money spent on the searched product category in order j for the searched keyword 
i.7 We assume there is latent spending intention ( ownijz ) that determines how much to spend on the 
searched product category, that is, 
                                                 
7 In the estimation, both ownijy  and 
cross
ijy  are rescaled by dividing the actual amount by 10. 
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where 1=ikSearch  if the searched category is the kth product category for keyword i, and 
0=ikSearch  if the searched category is not the kth  product category for keyword i. ijLatency  is the 
time duration in number of days between the search and the order j for keyword i. ijRank  is the 
average rank of keyword i for order j. iBrand  is a dummy variable indicating whether a brand name is 
included in the search keyword i. iLength   is the number of words included in the search keywords i. 
We have a total of 6 product categories, that is, K=6 and without loss of generality, we use category 6 
as the baseline. To complete the model specification, we assume the following distributions regarding 
the error term and intercept term: 
),0(~ 2own
own
ij N σε             (5.4) 
),(~ 2own
ownown
i N ταα             (5.5) 
 
In the second stage, the consumer decides on how much to spend on the non-searched product 
categories in total conditional on the spending on the searched product category. Let’s denote crossijy  
as the money spent on the non-searched product category in order j for the searched keyword i. We 
assume there is latent spending intention ( crossijz ) that determines how much to spend on the non-
searched product category, that is, 
cross
ij
cross
ij zy =    if crossijz > 0          (5.6) 
0=crossijy    if crossijz ≤  0          (5.7) 
We model the latent buying intention of the non-searched category as follows:  
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To complete the model specification, we assume the following distributions regarding the error term 
and intercept term: 
),0(~ 2cross
cross
ij N σε             (5.9) 
),(~ 2cross
crosscross
i N ταα            (5.10) 
Equations (5.1) – (5.3), and (5.6) – (5.8) lead to a non-linear fully non-recursive simultaneous 
equations model. Note that ownkγ , crosskγ  as well as own1β – own5β  are modeled as fixed effects due to the 
empirical identification with our data. 
 
5.1 Results 
We next discuss the findings from our analysis. In table 7a, the coefficient, γ1own is negative and 
significant suggesting that consumer average spending on the searched category is lower in category 1 
than category 6. On the other hand, the coefficient, γ2own is positive and significant suggesting that the 
consumer average spending on the searched category is higher in category 2 than category 6. The 
coefficients, γ3own, γ4own, and γ5own are statistically insignificant suggesting that on an average, and 
consumers spend the same amount in each of these categories (3, 4 and 5) as they do in category 6 
when they search for a product in each of these categories.  
 
What are the main factors that affect this kind of consumer behavior? Based on the estimates in Table 
7a and 7b, we find that Latency tends to decrease consumer spending on the searched category, but 
increase their average spending on the non-searched category. Recall that latency is the time between 
when consumers click on an advertisement and when they actual purchase the product from the 
website. Intuitively, this result suggests that if consumers delay the final purchase of the product after 
the initial click on the ad, they are likely to digress from their original spending intention in the 
searched category and increasing their purchase of products in other non-searched categories. Note 
also that the coefficient of owny  is negative suggesting that if a consumer has already spent a lot on 
the category that they had originally searched for, then they are likely to spend less on the other 
categories. 
= = Insert Tables 7a and 7b = = 
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Interestingly, we find that the presence of Brand information in the search keyword advertisement 
does not affect the amount that consumers spend on the category that they originally searched for on 
the search engine. However, note from Table 7b that it does significantly increase consumers’ 
spending in the other categories. This implies that the presence of a brand name in a keyword 
advertisement can have a strong switching effect on consumer’s purchasing propensities. It has a 
similar flavor to the bait and switch strategies used by retailers, when they attract consumers to their 
stores based advertisements in one category and then induce them to buy a product in a different 
category addition to the original product, perhaps through some marketing promotion. Thus, our 
analysis indicates a strong cross-selling potential of a sponsored search advertisement that contains a 
brand name in it. The statistically significant estimates of γ1cross, γ2cross, and γ3cross in Table 7b indicate 
that there are complementary demands for three product categories at each purchase incidence. In 
particular, we see in Table 7b that categories 1, 2, and 3 (bath, bedding and electrical appliances) 
exhibit the strongest opportunities for cross-selling.8 
 
We find that neither Rank nor the Length has any impact on consumers’ spending either on the 
searched category or the non-searched category. This is not too surprising. Both these attributes are 
likely to influence consumer click-through behavior but are unlikely to affect their latent spending 
intention once they have already landed on the retailer’s web page. As a robustness check, we also fit a 
model that controls for the potential endogeneity in Rank. We found similar results on the coefficient 
estimates. We also included dummies for different categories of landing pages such as search page, 
shop, home page, information page, product page and category page. This did not affect the 
qualitative nature of the results, and moreover the estimates on the dummies were not statistically 
significant. 
 
6. Managerial Implications and Conclusion 
The phenomenon of sponsored search advertising is gaining ground as the largest source of revenues 
for search engines. However, we have little understanding of how consumers respond to sponsored 
search advertising on the Internet, and how what factors drive firms’ decision on bid prices and ranks. 
In this research, we focus on understanding how sponsored search advertising affects consumer 
                                                 
8Note that our model can only capture the contemporaneous complementary relationship among products on the same 
purchase occasion. We do not have sufficient information to discuss the exact acquisition sequence amongst categories.  
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search and purchasing patterns on the Internet. Specifically, we focus on analyzing the impact of 
different keyword level covariates on different metrics of sponsored search advertisement 
performance taking both consumer and firm behavior into account. Finally, we analyze the cross-
selling potential from sponsored search advertising.  
 
Using a unique panel dataset of several hundred keywords collected from a nationwide retailer that 
advertises on Google, we empirically model the relationship between different metrics such as click-
through rates, conversion rates and keyword ranks. We use a Hierarchical Bayesian modeling 
framework and estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.   
We began our research with an investigation of how keyword specific characteristics affect click-
through rates, conversion rates and ranks, and found considerable differences across keywords. Since 
the ultimate aim of sponsored search advertisement is to increase demand, we also aim to analyze the 
profitability of such ads using different metrics of performance. Towards this, we compare the cross-
selling potential of keywords across different categories in paid search advertisement. Our data reveals 
that there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in terms of the revenues that accrue from 
different keywords as well as significant differences in the performance metrics.  
 
Arguably, the mix of retailer-specific and brand-specific keywords in an online advertiser's portfolio 
has some analogies to other kinds of marketing mix decisions faced by firms in many markets. For 
instance, typically it is the retailer who engages in ‘retail store’ advertising that has a relatively 
'monopolistic' market. In contrast, typically it is the manufacturer who engages in advertising 
‘national-brands’. From the retailer’s perspective, these advertisements are likely to be relatively more 
'competitive' since national brands are likely to be stocked by its competitors too. Retailer-name 
searches are navigational searches, and are analogous to a customer finding the retailer's phone 
number or address in the White Pages. These searches are driven by brand awareness generated by 
catalog mailings, TV ads, etc, and are likely to have come from more ‘loyal’ consumers. Even though 
the referral to the retailer’s website came through a search engine, the search engine had very little to 
do with generating the demand in the first place. On the other hand, searches on product or 
manufacturer specific brand names are analogous to consumers going to the Yellow Pages—they 
know they need a product or service, but don't yet know where to buy it (Kaufman 2007). These are 
likely to be “competitive” searches. Even for loyal buyers, a “branded” search means the searcher is 
surveying the market and is vulnerable to competition. If the advertiser wins the click and the order, 
that implies they have taken market share away from a competitor. Thus, retailer-specific keywords 
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are likely to be searched and clicked by 'loyal' consumers who are inclined towards buying from that 
retailer whereas brand-specific keywords are likely to be searched and clicked by the 'shoppers or 
searchers’ who can easily switch to competition. Our policy simulations show that average profitability 
from conversions generated by 'retailer' keywords is much higher than that from ‘brand' keywords. 
Our results thus provide some managerial insights for an advertiser of sponsoring such retail store 
keywords (retailer-specific keywords) with national-brand keywords (brand-specific keywords). 
Most firms who sponsor online keyword advertisements set a daily budget, select a set of keywords, 
determine a bid price for each keyword, and designate an ad associated with each selected keyword. If 
the company’s spending has exceeded its daily budget, however, its ads will not be displayed. With 
millions of available keywords and a highly uncertain click-through rate associated with the ad for 
each keyword, identifying the most profitable set of keywords given the daily budget constraint 
becomes challenging for companies wishing to promote their goods and services via search-based 
advertising (Rusmevichientong and Williamson 2006). In this regard, our analysis reveals that while 
retailer-specific information is more important than brand-specific information in predicting click-
through rates, the opposite holds true in predicting conversion rates.  Sponsored advertisements that 
contain retailer or brand information, or are more specific in their scope generally tend to have lower 
ranks (i.e., they are listed higher up on the screen). Since the search engine accounts for both bid price 
and previous click-through rates in deciding on the final rank, these results can have useful 
implications for a firm’s Internet paid search advertising strategy by shedding light on what the most 
“attractive” keywords from a firm’s perspective are, and how it should optimally bid in search engine 
advertising campaigns. The analysis of these keyword attributes on conversion rates also provide 
insights into what kind of keyword advertisers should bid on in the event that search engines migrate 
from a pay-per-click model to a pay-per-action model as Google has recently claimed it will do. 
 
Finally, we have shown some evidence that although the average click-through and conversion rates 
are typically very low in sponsored search, there are other benefits from such advertising. Specifically, 
retailers can not only refine their keyword purchases on search engines, but also set up relevant cross-
selling opportunities on their own websites by advertising ‘brand-specific’ keywords. The strategy is 
that when a consumer searches for a specific product and lands deep within the retailer’s website by 
clicking on its keyword advertisement, the retailer can pair that product with other products that sell 
well with that keyword and prominently feature them on its website. This provides a retailer with an 
opportunity to not only convert someone on the product they had searched for, but also get other 
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opportunities for cross-selling in a sponsored search environments. From the retailer’s perspective, 
there could be synergies in promoting both categories simultaneously rather than separately. Indeed 
anecdotal evidence suggests that retailers are engaging in the practice of looking up the most-searched 
and the top-converting keywords on their websites, and bidding for them on search engines. They are 
taking cross-selling reports from other marketing mix campaigns and putting up the top cross-selling 
product for the searched product on the same page (Squire 2003). Consumers who display high cross-
selling potential in paid search advertising can also be targeted with coupons customized to induce 
such bundled purchases, not only in the online world but also in the offline world. This becomes 
important in light of the fact that 79% of users who search on Google end up purchasing offline at a 
retail store location.9 
 
Interestingly, we find that latency in purchases is not necessarily detrimental for a firm that is 
sponsoring the ad. While it is in general associated with a reduction the purchases of the category that 
the consumer was searching for, it increases consumers’ spending in other product categories. In a 
way, it has an impact similar to a bait and switch strategy. This effect is particularly strong in keywords 
that have a brand name in it, since consumers who click on branded keywords typically tend to spend 
more on other categories than the one they were originally searching for. Thus, online advertisers can 
focus on investing more often in such keywords relative to the generic keywords, especially if the 
cannibalization effect of drawing out consumers from one category is smaller relative to revenue 
expansion effect. From the point of view of the manufacturer, such dependencies across categories 
may be exploited by running cooperative promotions within brands but across categories. Of course, 
such decisions would need a detailed profitability analysis based not only on the potential from cross-
selling in other product categories but also the performance of the keyword in its own category. 
 
To conclude, our paper is the first known empirical study that estimates the effect of sponsored 
search advertising at a keyword level on consumer search and purchase behavior in electronic markets 
by empirically estimating the impact of keyword attributes on consumer actions. We also analyze the 
impact of these covariates on the decisions of the firms involved in the sponsored advertising 
process-the bid price of the advertiser and the rank allotted by the search engine to the advertiser. We 
conduct simulations to assess the relative profit impact from changes in bid prices, and find that 
despite some learning, the advertiser is not bidding optimally. Our findings also confirm the opinions 
                                                 
9 2005 Home and Garden Survey, conducted by Media-Screen and GMI (April 2005). 
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postulated by the popular press that search engines factor in both the bid price of the advertiser as 
well as the performance metrics such as prior click-through rates before allotting the final rank to a 
given ad. Finally, using data on product-level variables, we have demonstrated that there exists 
significant potential for cross-selling through search keyword advertisements.  
 
Our paper has several limitations. These limitations arise primarily from the lack of information in our 
data. For example, we do not have data on competition. That is, we do not know the keyword ranks 
or other performance metrics such as click-through rates and conversion rates of the keyword 
advertisements of the competitors of the firm whose data we have used in this paper. Further, we do 
not have sufficient data to estimate category specific cross-selling effects. Using larger datasets, future 
work can investigate the extent of cross-selling by product category in order to predict what is likely 
to be purchased next and when (for example, in Knott, Hayes and Neslin 2002). Further, we do not 
have any knowledge of other information that was mentioned in the textual description in the space 
following a paid advertisement during consumers’ queries. Future work could integrate that 
information with our modeling approach to have more precise estimates. We hope that this study will 
generate further interest in exploring this important emerging area in marketing.
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Appendix: The MCMC Algorithm 
 
We ran the MCMC chain for 40,000 iterations, and used the last 20,000 iterations to compute the 
mean and standard deviation of the posterior distribution of the model parameters, in both 
applications presented in the paper. Due to space constraint, we only report below the MCMC 
algorithm for the simultaneous model of click-through rate, conversion rate, bid price and keyword 
rank. The MCMC algorithm for the cross-selling model is available from the authors upon request.  
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We further define the following notations: 
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We use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a random walk chain to generate draws of ),( qij
p
ijij ccc =  
(see Chib and Greenberg 1995, p330, method 1).  Let )( pijc denote the previous draw, and then the 
next draw )( nijc is given by: 
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∆  is a draw from the density Normal(0, 0.015I) where I is the identity matrix. 
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where IW stands for the Inverted Wishart Distribution. 
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7. Draw ]',,,,[ 321102 κκκθθ=f  similar to step 6 
 
8. Draw ]',,,,,,,,[ 2322212131211103 ρρρωρρρωω=f  similar to step 6 
 
9. Draw ]',,,,[ 321104 πππφφ=f  similar to step 6 
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics of the Paid Search Data (N=5147) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Impressions 383.376 2082.086 1 97424
Clicks 32.915 519.555 0 33330
Orders 0.483 8.212 0 527
Click-through Rate (CTR) 0.008 0.059 0 1
Conversion Rate 0.013 0.073 0 1
Bid Price 0.294 0.173 0.005 1.410
Lag Rank 4.851 6.394 1 64
Log (Lag Profit) 0.106 1.748 -5.160 10.710
Rank 5.179 7.112 1 64
Lag CTR 0.007 0.053 0 1
Retailer 0.057 0.232 0 1
Brand 0.398 0.490 0 1
Length 2.588 0.734 1 6
 
 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics of the Cross-Selling Data (N=801) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Order Value – Own ($) 79.007 100.812 0 930
Order Value – Cross ($) 21.805 78.534 0 1249
Latency 1.062 3.527 0 29
Rank 1.257 1.999 1 40.25
Brand 0.883 0.322 0 1
Length 2.410 0.956 0 5
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Table 2a: Coefficient Estimates on Click-through Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Click-through Model ( βΣ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Posterior means and posterior standard deviations (in the parenthesis) are reported, and 
estimates that are significant at 95% are bolded in Tables 2a - 7. 
 Intercept Retailer Brand Length 
 
0β  1α  2α  3α  
Intercept -2.062 2.031 -0.105 -0.109 
 (0.050) (0.155) (0.090) (0.049) 
 
 
1β  
 
1γ  
 
2γ  
 
3γ  
Rank -0.251 -0.251 -0.056 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.061) (0.022) (0.014) 
 0iβ (Intercept) 1iβ (Rank) 
0iβ (Intercept) 0.905 -0.085 
 (0.077) (0.013) 
   
1iβ (Rank) -0.085 0.031 
 (0.013) (0.003) 
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Table 3a: Coefficient Estimates on Conversion Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Conversion Model ( θΣ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Intercept Retailer Brand Length 
 0θ  1δ  2δ  3δ  
Intercept -4.812 -0.481 0.469 -0.130 
 (0.213) (0.339) (0.138) (0.074) 
 
 
1θ  1κ  2κ  3κ  
Rank -0.099 0.293 0.049 0.037 
 (0.031) (0.106) (0.035) (0.031) 
 
 
2θ     
CTR 0.822    
 (0.368)    
 
0iθ (Intercept) 1iθ (Rank) 
0iθ (Intercept) 0.503 -0.051 
 (0.116) (0.022) 
   
1iθ (Rank) -0.051 0.067 
 (0.022) (0.007) 
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Table 4a: Coefficient Estimates on Bid Price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Bid Price Model ( ωΣ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Intercept Retailer Brand Length 
 
 
0ω  1λ  2λ  3λ  
Intercept -1.285 -1.036 -0.171 0.095 
 (0.020) (0.089) (0.043) (0.027) 
 
 
1ω  11ρ  12ρ  13ρ  
LagRank -0.027 0.110 0.013 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.039) (0.013) (0.008) 
 
 
2ω  21ρ  22ρ  23ρ  
LagProfit -0.020 -0.049 -0.005 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.033) (0.022) (0.013) 
 0iω (Intercept) 1iω (LagRank) 1iω (LagProfit)
0iω (Intercept) 0.255 -0.027 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.005) 
    
1iω (LagRank) -0.027 0.015 0.0005 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
1iω (LagProfit) 0.009 0.0005 0.029 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
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Table 5a: Coefficient Estimates on Keyword Rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5b: Unobserved Heterogeneity Estimates in the Keyword Rank Model ( θΣ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Intercept Retailer Brand Length 
 0φ  1τ  2τ  3τ  
Intercept 2.119 -0.636 -0.434 -0.109 
 (0.123) (0.152) (0.076) (0.044) 
 
 
1φ  1π  2π  3π  
Bid Price -3.025 1.787 0.307 0.455 
 (0.353) (0.390) (0.179) (0.124) 
 
 
2φ     
CTR -1.328    
 (0.080)    
 
0φ (Intercept) 1φ (Rank) 
0φ (Intercept) 1.289 -2.007 
 (0.072) (0.146) 
   
1φ (Bid Price) -2.007 3.886 
 (0.146) (0.334) 
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Table 6: Estimated Covariance across Click-through, Conversion, Bid Price and Rank (Ω ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Click-through Conversion Bid Price Rank 
Click-through 0.461 -0.077 0.015 0.279 
 (0.038) (0.062) (0.007) (0.020) 
     
Conversion -0.077 0.254 -0.043 -0.054 
 (0.062) (0.045) (0.019) (0.043) 
     
Bid Price 0.015 -0.043 0.170 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Rank 0.279 -0.054 -0.012 0.250 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.006) (0.008) 
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Table 7a: Estimates on Consumer Spending on the Searched Product Category 
Intercept Latency Rank Brand Length 
ownα  own1β  own2β  own3β  own4β  
8.349 -0.410 0.024 -1.756 -1.061 
(2.974) (0.079) (0.145) (1.496) (0.900) 
     
Search1 Search2 Search3 Search4 Search5 
own
1γ  own2γ  own3γ  own4γ  own5γ  
-17.845 6.569 4.619 -0.252 -4.739 
(4.255) (2.250) (2.658) (2.263) (3.100) 
     
2
ownσ  2ownτ     
114.361 12.167    
(6.910) (4.740)    
 
 
Table 7b: Estimates on Consumer Spending on Non-Searched Product Category 
Intercept Latency Rank Brand Length owny  
crossα  cross1β  cross2β  cross3β  cross4β  cross5β  
-9.973 0.583 -0.311 7.256 1.770 -0.086 
(4.926) (0.131) (0.327) (2.345) (1.486) (0.016) 
      
Search1 Search2 Search3 Search4 Search5  
cross
1γ  cross2γ  cross3γ  cross4γ  cross5γ   
12.718 -11.600 -17.056 -3.576 -2.714  
(4.767) (3.478) (4.486) (3.319) (4.128)  
      
2
crossσ  2crossτ      
260.199 7.779     
(27.040) (3.236)     
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Figure 1a: Distribution of the Difference between Optimal and Actual Bids 
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Figure 1b. Distribution of the Log of Difference in Expected Profits using Optimal and Actual Bids 
 
